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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE February 19, 1971 
LAOS: SOME QUESTIONS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at 
the moment, the situation in Southeast 
Asia shows clearly that for many months 
U.S. casualties have been held lower, that 
fewer Americans have been engaged in 
combat, and that the cost of the war has 
decreased. These are consequences of the 
withdrawal of more than 200,000 Amer-
icans, a decision which was made at the 
outset of this administration. The con-
sequences are, of course, welcome. 
On the other side of the coin, it is also 
obvious that the arena of the war in 
Vietnam has been enlarged into an Indo-
chinese war and the executive branch 
has made us partners in that expansion. 
First came the invasion of Cambodia last 
spring with U.S. ground forces and the 
subsequent widespread devastation of 
what had been the stable economic and 
social life of that country. We are there 
now with hundreds of millions of dollars 
in aid and a n.ounting stat! of American 
officials. Now there is the invasion of 
Laos by South Vietnamese ground forces 
supported by American firepower, air-
power and logistical support and the like-
lihood of more intense participation by 
North Vietnamese forces in this area. 
close to its border. 
This recent thrust of all-out conflict 
into still another region of Southeast 
As1a represents a gamble which may not 
be worth tlie risks involved. Rather than 
a sh01 tening of the war and a further 
1 eduction of casualties, the consequences 
of tliis air-ground invasion may be to 
lengthen the war and increase the cas-
ualties. The outcome of this new military 
venture depends not only on the success 
of the South Vietnamese forces in Laos 
but on the reaction there and elsewhere 
of the North Vietnamese and perhaps 
other Asian nations. 
The gamble in Laos is likely, in my 
opinion, to make it still more difficult to 
arrive at a negotiated settlement. Fur-
thermore, it may well increase, again, 
the number of U.S . . casualties and raise 
the number 'of American prisoners of war 
who have been taken in Southeast Asia. 
With regard to the American prison-
ers. the North Vietnamese have stated 
that the issue would not even be discus-
sed until it is evident that U.S. forces are 
to be withdrawn completely from Viet-
nam. In my opinion, these men are held 
as hostages to that end and this action is 
almost certain to delay their release. 
Threats are not likely to deter North 
Vietnam from that course. 
Nor is it at all certain, as has been 
suggested, thatr-
They-'the North Vletnamea~have to 
fight ther~ln Laos-or give up the struggle. 
The option is theirs as it has been from 
the outset. The fact is that they still have 
many cards in Cambodia, elsewhere in 
Laos, in South Vietnam, and in North 
Vietnam. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The 
time of the Senator from Montana has 
expired. 
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, if the Chair will recognize me, I 
shall be glad to yield to the able ma-
jority leader my 3 minutes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sen-
ator from West Virginia. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The 
Senator from Montana may proceed. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what 
if they opt not to fight at this time in 
Laos? What 1f they do stand and win 
against South Vietnamese forces in that 
remote area? What course is open to this 
Nation then? 
What if they draw back now but re-
turn in May and resume use of the pres-
ent Ho Chi Minh Trails or new trails on 
an accelerated basis? 
What if the present penetration 
prompts them to move further west on 
the approaches to Thailand, even as the 
incursion into the Cambodian border 
areas last spring prompted them to move 
westward throughout Cambodia? 
In short, we must ask . ourselves 
whether a temporary invasion of Laos, 
and I emphasize the word temporary, 
will have any real et!ect on the capa-
b111ties of North Vietnam to wage a con-
tinuing war in Southeast Asia? Accord-
ing to North Vietnamese calculations, 
they have already been at war at least 
25 years and an additional 25 years of 
conflict may well be anticipated. 
These are questions which put in bal-
ance the military gamble which is now 
taking place in Laos. Is it worth the 
lives-American and others-which it al-
ready claims? Will it fulfill the objective 
of shortening the war, so that the U.S. 
military phaseout can be continued and 
accelerated? Will it hasten negotiations 
which will end this tragedy and thus per-
mit a complete U.S. withdrawal? 
Will it help the plight of our prisoners 
of war? 
Indeed, has any previous escalation of 
the conflict since the Tonkin Gulf----the 
use of B-52 bombers, the massive air and 
naval war against North Vietnam, the 
secret air war in Laos, the incw·sion into 
Cambodia--have any one of these pre-
vious escalations fulfilled its promise to 
these ends? 
In my opinion we may well be up 
against a stacked deck in Laos. 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, we all 
honor the distinguished majority lead-
er's views here. I am bound ·to say that 
I cannot accept them as stated, for a 
number of reasons. 
First, I think it ought to be pointed 
out that the incursion into Cambodia of 
last .May was limited, that it worked, that 
it had the effect of cutting olf 85 percent 
of the supplies being received by the 
enemy which were coming through Si-
hanoukville, that we know of, to all of 
the personnel, and 15 percent of the sup-
plies were coming down the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. 
This incursion into Laos may or may 
not succeed. It is the judgment of our 
military authorities that it will succeed. 
I! it does, it will severely cripple the 
enemy's ability to resist and will improve 
our chances in the talks at Paris and will 
greatly strengthen the ongoing Vietnam-
ization of the South Vietnamese. 
If this happens, then the enemy will be 
unable to mass forces for retaliation 
during the dry season. He certainly will 
not be able to do so during the monsoon 
or the wet season. This carries him on 
inbo November or December. 
The purpose of these operations 1s to 
enable us to get our troops out of there, 
which we are doing. Our withdrawal 
from Indochina is continuing during the 
incursion of the South Vietnamese into 
Laos. 
Indeed, I think this is why we can 
point· to the cooling of America and to 
the challenges which other priorities are 
demanding, the greening of America and 
the growing of America. 
I cannot join in the deploring of the 
successful operations, operations which 
so far at least, appear to be successful, 
whim everything the President has done 
has been proven to be justified in ending 
the war. 
The President has taken large num-
bers o'f troops out. And he wjll take more 
out. On May 1, or around that time, there 
will be other announcements. 
It seems tame that this 1s not a height-
ening of the war but a constriction of the 
war. The war has always been in Laos. It 
has alw~eys been in Cambodia. The dit!er-
ence is that only one side was able to 
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use these privileged .sanctuaries, and now 
the other side, without the use of U.S. 
ground forces, have put an end to some-
thing that ought to have been put an 
end to 4 years or more ago, I respect-
fully submit. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an 
article entitled, "The Curious Liberal 
View ·of Southeast Asia," written by 
Crosby S . Noyes of· February 7, 1971. This 
article does not relate to what the dis-
tinguished majority leader has had to 
say. 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
THE CuRious LmERAL VIEw OF SouTHEAsT ASIA 
(By Crosby S. Noyes) 
The anger of the liberals over recent devel-
opments In Southeast Asia. defies rational 
analysis. 
What Is It that they want? What do they 
really feel? What would they do If they were 
making the decisions about our policy In 
Asia.? 
The answers, I submit, are not nearly as 
simple as they seem. The fatal weakness of 
the liberal position at this point Is that It 
Is Inherently a. minority position, not because 
the government or the majority of the coun-
try Is reactionary and warlike, but because 
what the liberals recommend could not be 
adopted by any American government. 
The one consistent characteristic of liberal 
thinking today Is that of dissent-not from 
any particuLar policy, but from any policy 
that has the slightest chance of success. 
When It comes to Southeast Asia., the !aUure 
of American policy bas become a primary 
article of ta.Ith to practicing liberals. 
The anger at the present course of events 
Is real enough. There Is l!ttle that happens 
In this country or abroad that does not fuel 
their sense of exasperation a.nd dismay. Their 
capacity for dire prediction 1s llmltless. 
The liberals are even angry at each other. 
The peace movement, they complain, Is dead, 
kU!ed otr by the machinations of a. devious 
&dmln!Btmtlon. Even the peace bloc In the 
Senate seems to be showing new signs o! In-
decision and Impotence. 
And meanwbUe, of course, everything 1s 
going to hell In a bandbasket. 
The Cambodians, despite all the predic-
tions, are showing signs of determination In 
resisting the lnvaalon of their country by 
North VIetnam. The South VIetnamese are 
said to be Invading Laos with the object-
just Imagine It--o! breaking up Communist 
supply lines Into tbetr country. And worst 
of &II, the Americana are helping them, even 
wb1le cl&lmlng that they Intend to withdraw 
the bulk of their forces In VIetnam as quickly 
as possible. 
Small wonder the liberals feel betrayed. 
This Is hardly the scenario they had in mind 
when the Senate doves pushed through the 
Cooper-Church a.mendJ:ll,ent last summer. 
And if, in the end, they were unable to limit 
the use of American a.lr power In supporting 
a.cttons in Laos and Cambodia, why surely 
the administration should have understood 
what they meant to do. 
But what !s It exactly that they did in-
tend? The liberal lexicon Is a bit murky 
when It comes to practical policy, but a 
few solid points show through the rhetoric. 
They would, presumably, prohibit all help 
for Camboc11a and Laos and !or the South 
VIetnamese operating in these countries. 
They also would ll<lt a firm date !or the end 
of the American Involvement In VIetnam-
Including the withdrawal or all American 
troops and support for the Vietnamese army. 
And nne.Uy, they would pull the rug out from 
under the "unrepresentative and repressive" 
government in Saigon and set up In Its place 
a coalition '!1.1lllng to come to terms with 
Hanoi. 
Or would they? 
The curious thing about the Senate lib-
erals ls that while they readily make ruinous 
suggestions about what others might do, 
they show little zest !or putting such sugges-
tions Into effect. The chances, for ln~tance, 
of extending the Cooper-Church amendment 
to cover the use of American air power ln 
CambOdia and Laos are rated at practically 
zero. 
If you B.lik them, furthermore. whether 
they really would prefer to see a Communist 
government in control In Cambodia or Laos, 
they will say of course not If you a>'k them 
who would be served by a public timetable 
for an American departure from \ l~tnam, 
they change the subject. If you ask them 
whether they consider the goYernment In 
Hanoi more representat i\·e and less repreB-
slve than the one In Saigon, they Bay it Is 
beside the point. 
More than anything el<e , one feels. there 
Is an apprehension that It may all work 
out-that the disaster they have been pre-
dicting so relentlessly over the years may 
not actually come about. It Is, quite obvi-
ously, a luxury which only the oppo,ltlon 
can at'ford. And the liberals at thl5 point 
seem devoutly attached to theJr oppc-sitlon 
role. 
Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, I rise tD 
support what the distinguished Senator 
from Pennsylvania has had to say. 
I am distressed by the continuing criti-
cism of our actions in Southeast Asia, 
specifically our bombing of Laos and 
Cambodia. This running commentary in 
many Instances is little more than "cry-
ing wolf." 
I regret these attack~ against the Pres-
ident, because they only hinder our ef-
forts to withdraw Ame1ican fighting men 
from this conflict and make it increas-
ingly difficult to achieve a negotiated 
peace. 
Is it not tl.me to put aside partisan 
caterwauling and unite in commorn pur-
POse to end this tragic war? Is it not tl.me 
to stop trying to use American POW's as 
poll tical pawns? 
No one wants to prolong any war. In-
stead of being "barbaric," our bombing 
missions in Laos and Cambodia were 
called to hit the enemies last remaining 
supply route-to destroy their ammuni-
tion, supplies, and food-and, therefore, 
theu· ability to wage war. 
The President has kept his word to 
the American people. Critics should note 
that we now have some 330,000 men in 
Vietnam, 200,000 less than were there 2 
years ago. We continue to negotiate sin-
cerely-without any response from the 
North Vietnamese other than the usual 
diatribe. 
We continue to seek humane treat-
ment and early release of American pris-
oners of war-without any response 
from North Vietnam; other than a con-
tinuation of the abuse of our men. 
Is it America that is now at fault? I 
think not. Nor do I believe charges of 
political malfeasance assist the cause of 
peace or the hope for early return of our 
men. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, when 
the distinguished Senator from Tennes-
see has had an opportunity to read in full 
the remarks which I made, he will under-
stand that I was not attacking the Presi-
dent of the United States. I have never 
attacked any President of the United 
States. I realize the tremendous responsi-
bilities which any President has. How-
ever, by the same token, I am aware of 
the responsibilities which we as individ-
ual Senators have. 
In response to the remarks of my dis-
tinguished counterpart, the minority 
leader. may I say that I, too, am pleased 
that as far as the reactions of the United 
States are concerned, this represents a 
cooling-off period, to use his words. But 
the fact that there is such a period does 
not mean that these questions which I 
have raised in relation to Vietnam and 
Indochina, and which may well spread 
elsewhere. are not worthy of considera-
tion by the Senate and the American 
people. 
I believe that in the course of my re-
marks I gave the President full credit for 
the withdrawal of troops and the slowing 
down of the war up to this time. But it is 
pretty fair to say that under the present 
circumstances the war might well be in-
creased and expanded, the casualties 
could be increased, the possibilities of the 
release of the POW's could be decreased, 
and our chances for success, which are 
not very good at the present, would not 
be bettered in the negotiations at Paris. 
One thing I have not forgotten-and 
do not intend to forget-is the casualty 
lists that come in. I have not gotten an 
answer as to the latest casualties, for the 
last 3 weeks, from the Department of 
Defense. 
As of January 9, 1971, however, 53.359 
Americans have died; 44,268 in combat, 
and 9,091 in noncombat capacities. The 
number of men wounded is 293,612 and 
the total figure of casualties is 346,971. 
I daresay that figure has increased by 
sevral thousand in the past month, 
cotmtlng both dead and wounded. 
So I rise on the floor of the Senate. as 
I always try to do with a proper under-
standing of the situation which con-
fronts this Nation, of a deep appreciation 
of the responsibilities which are the Pres-
ident's, but not forgetting for a moment 
that we, as Senators, have a responsi-
bility, and it is our duty and our obliga-
tion, to express our thoughts when. we 
can in good conscience. 
Mr. CHURCH addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The 
Senator from Idaho is recognized. 
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I wish to 
commend the distinguished majority 
leader for his excellent statement on the 
most recent developmentS in the war in 
Southeast Asia. 
Any intimation to the effect that the 
majority leader expresses a partisan view 
with regard to the war is so completely 
and utterly refuted by the record that I 
hardly need stress it here. Nevertheless, 
the Senate will remember well that the 
majority leader began to express his mis-
givings concerning this war long ago 
during the tenure of the Democratic 
P resident. He has been consistent 
throughout the years in admonishing 
against expansion of that war and Amer-
ican participation in it. If his advice had 
been taken years ago, 53,000 Americans 
would not have died in Vietnam and a 
quarter of a m1llion men would not have 
been maimed and wounded. 
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I, for one, am glad the distinguished 
maJont.y leader continues to ~pe!\k out 
Hist.or~ bears out the accuracy of Ins 
forecasts in the past and the soundness of 
his misgivings. 
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident. I wish to say most respectfully to 
the able Senator from Tennessee that I 
have read the statement by our distin-
guished majority leader and I listened 
with great care as he made that :-tat.e-
ment.. 
I recognize the fact. that. the Senator 
from Tennessee did not criticize the ma-
jority leader by name in his remarks, but 
coming on the heels of the remarks by 
the maJority leader it can be appropri-
ately il ferred by readers of the RECORD 
and those who ho,ard the remarks that 
some criticism might have been meant 
and directed to the majmity leader for 
the statement he had just made. 
In the majority leader's prepared 
statement there was no "cnliclsm' of 
the President. There was no attack on 
the President. I am using now the words 
of the able Senator from Tennessee, as 
I recall them. He used the words "attacks 
ag·ainst the President." There was no 
attack against the President by the ma-
jority leader in his statement. There was 
no "partisanship." 
I have been in the Senate for 12 years, 
and I have seen Jess "partisanship" dis-
played by the majority leader than I 
have seen displayed by any other leader 
in my 12 years in the Senate, my 6 years 
in the House of Representatives, and my 
6 years in both houses of the West Vir-
ginia Legislature. There is supposed to be 
a little partisanship in a party leader, 
but there was none in this speech by the 
distinguished majority leader. 
The majority leader did not say any-
thing that would indicate an attempt t.o 
"use American prisoners of war as politi-
cal pawns." I think the record should be 
made clear that the majority leader 
raised legitimate questions-questions 
that should be raised. I salute him for 
raising those questons. I would ha\'e a 
few of my own. For example, I would 
like to see a more definitive announce-
ment on how much this operation is 
costing t.he United States in men and,.. 
rmateriel, the exact number of heli-
copters that have been downed, and the 
number of helicopters that could not be 
retrieved. I would like to know how many 
Americans have died as a result ot this 
offensive. I do not necessarily criticize 
the efforts being made in Laos by rais-
ing these questions, but they are legiti-
mate questions. Of course, North Viet-
namese troops are being forced to fight. 
If they chose not to do so, the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail would be effectively cut and 
the threat to American forces in South 
Vietnam would be weakened. There are 
two sides to the issue, but the questions 
raised here today are reasonable and 
pertinent. 
I hope we would be very careful not to 
mt6interpret as partisan that which was 
not partisan or as an attack upon the 
President that which was not. The state-
ment by the majority leader was clear 
and ought not be misunderstood. 
Mr. BROCK. Mr. nresident, may I say 
to the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia and particularly to the distin-
guished majo1 ;ty leader thnt I appreci-
ate their comments. I, too, regret that my 
remark~ ~ell immedmtel~ fol' :)V.'ng V1e 
remarks b\' the Senator from Montana. 
I would ·point out for thC" record that 
my remarks were prcrared prior .o th 
session of Lh!! Senute this morni11g, and 
i 1 reSl»Ol se to .comments I rend i'l the 
newspaper la~t e\·enmg and tliis morning. 
Tlw.:;e slt tements statcd that the Ples,-
dent has given up on a political Sfllu-
tion, and that he has gneu up on negotm-
tions in Paris, and t.hat he has given up 
011 the release of ou!· prisoners and is 
ft rting with world war III. Those are 
::;t atemeuts with which I categorically 
disagree. Again I was re~ponding to the 
p1·ess account I read ·n the morning 
newspaper~. 
I want to make the situ.1tion absolutely 
clear that I did not refer to the di.,tin-
guished majority leader in my charges of 
partiansh.ip or charges of playing with 
our American prisoners of war I would 
not do so. 
Mr. MA...'Il'SFIELD. Mr. President, I ex-
PI ess my thanks to the distinguished 
Senator uom Tennessee for his most 
gracioUs remarks. I feel now that he had 
somethmg else in mind at the time. It 
was an w1fortw1at.e comcidence that all 
of these remarks happen to come at the 
same time, and I think now the record 
will not be misinterpreted. 
I thank the Senator. I 
Ptbruary 19, 1971 
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA) 
At the moment, the situation in Southeast Asia shows clearly 
that for many months U. s. casualties have been held lower, that fewer 
Americans have been engaged in combat, and that the cost of the war has 
decreased. These are consequences of the withdrawal of more than 200,000 
Americans, a decision which was made at the outset of this Administration. 
The consequences are, of course, welcome. 
On the other side of the coin, it is also obvious that the arena 
of the war in Viet Nam has been enlarged into an Indochinese war and the 
Executive Branch has made us partners in that expansion. First came the 
invasion of Cambodia last spring with Uo S. ground forces and the subse-
quent widespread devastation of what had been the stable economic and eoeial 
life of that country. We are there now with hundreds of millions of dollars 
in aid and a mounting staff of American officials. Now there is the invasion 
of Laos by South Vietnamese ground forces supported by American fire power, 
air power and logistical support and the likelihood of more intense parti-
cipation by North Vietnamese forces in this area close to its border. 
This recent thrust of all-out conflict into sti. 11 another region 
of Southeast Asia represents a gamble which may not be worth the risks 
involved. Rather than a shortening of the war and a further reduction of 
casualties, the consequences of this air-ground invasion may be to lengthen 
the war and increase the casualties. The outcome of this new military venture 
depends not only on the success of the South Vietnamese forces in Laos but on 
the reaction there and elsewhere of the North Vietnamese and perhaps other 
Asian nations to the invasion. 
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The gamble in Laos is likely, in my opinion, make it still more 
I' 
difficult to arrive at a negotiated settlement . FUrthermore, it may well 
increase, again, the number of U. S. casualties and raise the number of 
American prisoners of war who have been taken in Southeast Asia. 
With regard to the American prisoners , the North Vietnamese have 
stated that the issue would not even be discussed until it is evident that 
U. S. forces are to be withdrawn completely from Viet Nam. In my opinion, 
these men are held as hostages to that end and this action is almost certain 
i 
to delay their release . Threats are not likely to deter North Viet Nam 
from that course • 
Nor is it at all certain, as has been suggested, that "they (the 
North Vietnamese) have to fight there (in Laos) or give up the struggle . " 
The option is theirs as it has been from t he outset. The fact is that they 
still have many cards in Cambodia, elsewhere in Laos 1 in South Viet Nam and 
in North Viet Nam. What if they opt not to fight at this time in Laos? 
What if they do stand and win against South Vietnamese forces in that remote 
area? What course is open to this nation then? 
d'r:,. w 
What if they ~?back now but ret urn in May and resume use of the 
present Ho Chi Minh Trails or new trails on an accelerated basis? 
What if the present penetration prompts them to move further west 
on the approaches to Thailand, even as t he incursion int o the Cambodian 
border areas last spring prompt ed them to move westward throughout Cambodia? 
In short, we must ask ourselves whether a temporary invasion of 
Laos, and I emphasize the word temporary, will have any real effect on the 
..j'() W~"·~~-
capabilities of North Viet Nam 0f~~ a continuing war in Sout heast Asia? 
~ 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 47, Folder 14, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
.. '• I '• 
- 3 -
According to North Vietnamese calculations, they have already been at war 
at least 25 years and an additional 25 years of conflict may well be 
anticipated. 
These are questions which put in balance the mill tary gamble 
which is now taking place in Laos. Is it worth the lives--American and 
others--which it already claims? Will it fulfill the objective of shorten• 
ing the war, so that the U. S. military phase-out can be continued and 
accelerated? Will it hasten negotiations which will end this tragedy and 
thus penni t a complete U. S. withdrawal? 
Will it help the plight of our prisoners of war? 
Indeed, has any previous escalation of the conflict since the 
Tonkin Gulf--the use of B-52 banbers, the massive air and naval war against 
North Viet Nam, the secret air-war in Laos, the incursion into Cambodia--
have any of these previous escalations fulfilled its promise to these ends? 
In my opinion we may well be up against a stacked deck in Laos. 
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